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1. Introduction
Two of the more interesting aspects of the migration patterns of
undocumented Mexican workers are that their residential status in the U.S.
is typically nonpermanent and that they travel repeatedly between the two
countries. A traditional explanation of this behavior would point to large
and frequent variations in the U.S./Mexican wage differential. However,
data on border apprehensions of undocumented workers are not particularly
cyclical, and large changes in wage differentials are too infrequent to
explain the number of trips and the relatively short lengths of stay of an
average immigrant. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. It is
assumed that an immigrant's utility depends not only upon his lifetime
income, but also upon the location of his work effort. First, he has a
preference for home-country residence. This preference must be weighed
against any pecuniary advantage to working in the foreign country. But if
an immigrant diversifies his consumption of "goods", he will choose to
spend much of his working life in the home country even if the foreign wage
is permanently higher than the home wage. Second, he is assumed to be
concerned not only about how much total time he spends in the home country,
but also about how that time is distributed over his life cycle. Following
a popular theory of intertemporal consumer behavior, the immigrant is
assumed to have a preference for smoothing his life-cycle consumption of
home residence. This implies that, other things being equal, his utility-2-
will vary directly with the number of trips he makes to the foreign
country, and it suggests another basic tradeoff between the benefits of
more frequent visits and his income net of travelling costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the general
model of immigrant decision-making. The model simultaneously determines
the immigrant's net lifetime income, the total time allocated to
home-country and foreign-country residence, and the number of trips made to
the foreign country. Section 3 examines some special cases of the model
which parallel some simple theories of migration. Section 4 examines the
general case. It is shown that lifetime participation in the foreign labor
market will be more responsive to changes in the home wage than to equal,
but opposite, changes in the foreign wage. It is also shown that changes
in travelling costs have predictable consequences for the number of border
crossings, but not for the total time spent in the foreign labor market.
Section 5 summarizes the principal results and discusses some of their
empirical and policy implications.
2. The model ---
We can generally think of an immigrant's life-cycle utility as
depending upon the time paths of his consumption of goods and place of
residence. His problem is to maximize utility by choosing time paths of
consumption which are financially feasible. Such a framework is so
general, however, as to offer little insight into immigrant behavior. The
strategy will then be to impose further structure on the problem by making
some assumptions about the financial environment within which the immigrant• -3-
must operate and about the class of location paths which are analytically
tractable. These assumptions will be introduced sequentially so as to make
clear what additional structure is provided by each assumption.
First assume that capital markets are perfect, i.e. that the rate of
interest at which the immigrant can lend is equal to the rate at which he
can borrow. The financial constraints on his decisions can then be
expressed as an equality between the present discounted value of his goods
consumption and the present discounted value of his income net of
travelling costs. Moreover, it is possible to separate his decisions
regarding the location of work effort from decisions concerning the time
distribution of goods consumption. This requires no assumption of
separability in his life-cycle preferences for goods and location, only the
conceptual construction of an indirect utility function which expresses the
maximum utility possible given a particular discounted value of lifetime
goods consumption and a particular time path of location. Thus, if capital
markets are perfect, the immigrant's locational problem can be expressed as
(1) Max U(y,L)
s.t. y = PV(L)
where y is the discounted value of lifetime goods consumption, L is the
time path of location (with L(t) being a binary variable which equals 1 if
the immigrant chooses to reside in the home country at time t and 0 if he
resides in the foreign country), and PV is the discounted value of lifetime
income net of travelling costs.-4-
While (1) does impose some structure on the immigrant's decision
problem, it is still intractable given the generality allowed in choosing
location paths. To proceed any further, we need to restrict the class of
location paths to those with a simple parametric representation. Let us
consider only those location paths for which the length of stay in each of
the home and foreign countries is the same for all visits. Also assume
that the immigrant begins and ends his working life in the home country.1
Then all such location paths can be described by two parameters: the total
time spent in the home country (M) and the number of trips made to the
foreign country (n). Two examples are shown in Figures 1 and 2. In these
examples, n is varied from 2 to 4 and Mis held constant. A greater
variety of location paths can be generated by varying M.
By so restricting the class of admissible location paths, the




S.t. y = PV(M,n), 0 ~ M~ T,
n £ {O,1,2,...}, and
n =0 implies M= T
where T is the length of the immigrant's working life. The restriction
"'n =0 implies M=T"' excludes the possibility of spending time in the
foreign country without making a trip. It simply recognizes that the
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As a final simplification, suppose that the interest rate is zero and
that expected wages are constant across time. 3 Then (2) can be written as
(3) Max U(y,M,n)
s.t. Y=w*(T-M) + wM - cn,
Os Ms T, n £ {O,l,2,...I, and
n =0 implies M=T
where wand w* are the wages in the home and foreign countries and c is the
round-trip cost of each border crossing. The problem described by (3) is
offered as a basic model of immigrant behavior. The model determines net
lifetime income, the total time allocated to home and foreign residence,
and the number of trips made to the foreign country. Some special cases of
(3) will be considered in section 3. An analysis of the general case is
provided in section 4.
3. Some special ~
We begin the analysis of problem (3) by considering three special
cases: (a) where life-cycle utility depends only upon lifetime net income;
(b) where, after achieving a particular level of lifetime income, utility
then depends only upon the total time spent in the home country; and (c)
where utility depends upon lifetime income and total time spent in the home
country, but not upon the number of visits made to the home country.
(a) If utility is independent of Mand n, the immigrant's objective is
simply to maximize the discounted value of lifetime income net of• -6-
travelling costs. Since travelling confers no direct benefit, and since
both wages are assumed constant over time, optimal n is either 0 or 1.
Because utility is independent of the amount of time spent in the home
country, optimal Mis either 0 or T. Thus there are two solution
candidates:
M= 0, n = 1 which implies y = w*T - c;
M= T, n = 0 which implies y = wT.
It is optimal to emigrate, and to do so only once, if and only if the
difference between lifetime income in the foreign country and lifetime
income in the home country exceeds the cost of a single trip. Otherwise,
it is optimal to remain permanently in the home country.
This is, of course, a very simple and very familiar economic criterion
for migration. For purposes of comparison, however, it is useful to note
some of its impl ications. Fi.rst, the theory suggests that, if we aggregate
over all immigrants, the number of trips made to and the total time spent
in the foreign country will be bound up with one another and will,
therefore, move together. Any policy which succeeds in reducing the number
of trips made to the foreign country will necessarily reduce the total time
spent working in the foreign labor market. Second, the theory is quite
strict concerning the effect on the location of work effort of changes in
wages Or travelling costs. Specifically, immigrants will spend less time
working in the foreign labor market the higher is the home wage, the lower
is the foreign wage, or the higher are the travelling costs. Finally, note
that any given change in the home wage will have the same impact on the
location of work effort as an equal, but opposite, change in the foreign-7-
wage. It is this property of the theory which provides justification for
treating labor supply to a particular location simply as a function of the
absolute wage differential.
(b) Suppose now that the immigrant's objective is to reach a
particular level of net lifetime income (yo), but to then spend as much
time as possible in the home country.4 Then assuming that yO can be
attained and that some time must be spent working in the foreign country,
it is optimal to emigrate once and to choose Mso that
yO =w*(T-M) + wM - c.
This is quite similar to the simple theory used to explain temporary
migration patterns in Africa. In contrast to case (a), the theory suggests
that more time will be spent working in the foreign labor market the lower
is the foreign wage or the higher are the travelling costs.
(c) The last special case to be considered contains elements of both
of the previous cases. Here we assume that the immigrant's utility varies
directly with both net lifetime income and total time spent in the home
country. We ignore until section 4 the possibility of utility also being
dependent upon the number of trips. Thus the optimal number of trips to
the foreign country is at most one. In what follows, we shall assume that
it is optimal to migrate.
Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic treatment of the immigrant's problem.
His preferences are defined by indifference curves that are convex to the
origin. The constraints on his choice of y and Mare represented by the
line segments AB and Be. The slope of AB, the cost of Min terms of y,






attainable indifference curve lies tangent to the constraint. We now
determine the effect on Mof changes in w, w*, and c.
Consider first an increase in home wages. As shown in
Figure 3, an increase in w serves to lower the relative cost of Mand to
enable the immigrant to reach a higher indifference curve. Assuming Mis a
normal commodity, the immigrant will unambiguously choose to spend more
time working in the home country and less in the foreign country. The
lower relative cost of home residence encourages him to substitute toward M
along his original indifference curve, and, since maximum utility is
increased, this increase in Mis reinforced by the "income" effect.
Figure 3 can also be used to show the effect of a decrease in the
foreign wage (not shown). Once again, the relative cost of Mis lowered,
and there is a substitution effect toward spending more time in the home
country. Here, however, maximum utility is reduced and the income effect
discourages home residence. Increases in home wages and decreases in
foreign wages are not symmetric in their impact on the location of work
effort. Indeed, if substantial time had been originally allocated to
foreign residence, it is quite conceivable that a fall in foreign wages
could induce immigrants to spend more of their lives working in the foreign
country.
Finally consider the effect of an increase in travelling costs. As is
clear from Figure 3, the increase in c is equivalent to a lump sum tax.
There is no substitution effect, only an income effect which encourages the
immigrant to spend more time working in the foreign country. This result
is, however, sensitive to the assumption that utility is independent of the• -9-
number of trips. More generally, an increase in c will reduce the number
of trips which, in turn, will shift the constraint line out toward its
original position and may alter the slopes of indifference curves in the
(y,M) plane.
4. General analysis
The location paths in Figures 1 and 2 were drawn so as to offer the
same total quantity of home residence. They differ only in the lengths of
stay per visit. Would an immigrant then be indifferent between the two if
his lifetime income net of travelling costs were the same in each case?
The assumption made now is that he would not be. In particular, he would
prefer the location path shown in Figure 2 because it provides a more even
life-cycle distribution of home residence. More generally, an immigrant's
utility will vary directly with the number of trips he makes if his
lifetime income net of travelling costs and the total time he spends in the
home country are held constant.
One reason, of course, for allowing the number of trips to affect
utility directly is to explain the migration patterns of temporary workers.
As previously discussed, if there is no non-pecuniary benefit to changing
location, and if the differential between home and foreign wages varies
little over time, the optimal number of trips to the foreign country is at
most one. But there is another, more basic reason. A premise which
underlies much of the economic theory of intertemporal allocation is that
individuals prefer to smooth their consumption over time. Such a
preference is quite familiar from the life-cycle theory of saving, and it-10-
is implicit whenever multi-period utility is expressed as a sum of periodic
utilities which increase at a decreasing rate with periodic consumption.
But if individuals are so motivated in making intertemporal choices about
consumption of food, housing, etc., would they not have similar preferences
for consumption of other "goods,,?5 If immigrants have a preference for
home residence, they should also prefer to evenly distribute that time over
their life cycles. In our parametric representation of location paths, the
evenness with which home residence is consumed is determined by the number
of trips made to the foreign country.
An analysis of this case can be readily accomplished by rewriting (3)
as
(4) Max U(y,M,n)
S.t. w*T = y + (w*-w)M + cn,
0 $ M$ T, n E {0,1,2,...1, and
n = 0 implies M= T.
Apart from the integer constraint on n, the immigrant's decision is a
standard 3-commodity consumer problem with a time endowment. There are
three "commodities" -- y, M, and n -- with own prices 1, (w*-w), and c,
respectively. The remainder of this section will explore the implications
of (4) for immigrant responses to changes in wages and travelling costs.
In doing so, we shall ignore the integer constraint On n to make use of
comparative-statics properties which apply to continuous-choice problems






First consider an increase in the home-country wage rate. As shown
earlier in section 3, an increase in w reduces the price of home residence.
There will then be a substitution effect encouraging the immigrant to spend
more time working in the home country and discouraging his consumption of
one, but not necessarily both, of the other two goods, y and n. The number
of trips, in particular, will fall or rise depending upon whether total
time spent in the home country is substitutable for or complementary with
frequency of visit. By raising the immigrant's utility, an increase in
home wages also creates an income effect which encourages consumption of
all goods. On balance, the immigrant will unambiguously choose to spend
more of his working life in the home country, but he mayor may not make
fewer trips to the foreign country. With utility directly affected by the
place of residence, we cannot expect the total time spent in and the number
of trips made to the foreign country to move together.
Suppose now that wages in the foreign country fall. This is simply
another way in which the price of home residence can fall. The
substitution effects will then be the same as those associated with an
increase in home wages. Total time spent working in the home country will
rise, and the number of trips made to the foreign country can either fall
or rise. The symmetry in an immigrant's responses to changes in the two
wages are confined only to the substitution effects, however. If foreign
wages fall, utility is reduced. In this case, the income effect serves to
reduce both total home residence and the number of trips. On balance, the
immigrant mayor may not choose to spend less of his working life in the
foreign country, depending upon the relative strengths of the substitution
and income effects.-12-
Since the price of home residence is the absolute wage differential,
(w*-w), the substitution effects associated with a decrease in the foreign
wage are not only qualitatively identical to those created by an increase
in the home wage, they are quantitatively identical if the changes in the
two wages are equal in absolute value. This allows us to theoretically
rank an immigrant's marginal responses to changes in wages. For example,
consider his choice concerning the total time to be spent working in the
foreign country. An increase in the home wage will have the same
substitution effect as an equal, but opposite, change in the foreign wage.
But while the income effect discourages foreign work effort when the home
wage rises, it encourages foreign work effort when the foreign wage falls.
Therefore, the combined response in (T-M) will be less in the first case
than in the second. This can be mathematically expressed by the inequality
•
(5) a(T-M)/aw < -a(T-M)/aw*.
Through similar reasoning, it is clear that the sense of the inequality
would be reversed if we were to consider the differential responses in the
total time spent in the home country or the number of border crossings.
Finally, turn to the case of an increase in travelling costs. In
section 3, an increase in c was seen to produce no substitution effects.
Such is not the case if utility is directly affected by the number of
trips. An increase in c represents an increase in the own price of nand,
therefore, creates a substitution effect which discourages the number of








ambiguous, depending once again on whether Mis substitutable for or
complementary with n. What does carryover from the previous section is an
income effect which reduces both total home residence and the number of
trips. On balance, an increase in travelling costs will unambiguously
reduce the number of border crossings, but it mayor may not reduce the
total time spent working in the foreign country. Sufficiently large
increases in c must, of course, increase Mif all migration is made
prohibitively expensive. However, marginal increases in travelling costs
have an indeterminate impact on the location of work effort.
6. Summary and Implications
This paper has presented a simple model of immigrant decision-making
which explicitly recognizes a subjective preference for home residence.
The model determines the immigrant's net lifetime income, the total time
spent working in each of the home and foreign countries, and the number of
lifetime border crossings. The main results and their implications are
summarized below.
(1) The number of trips made to and the total time spent working in
the foreign country are distinct choice variables for the immigrant and, as
such, need not move together. This simple point has important
implications, for example, for studies of illegal Mexican immigration which
make use of data on U.S. border apprehensions.6 These studies are
frequently criticized for failing to distinguish increases in apprehensions
which result from greater apprehension effort from increases which stem
from a greater number of immigrants seeking entry. However, there is a-14-
more basic problem with these studies. Even if apprehension effort,
•
population, etc. are adequately controlled for, variations in apprehensions
will likely represent changes in the number of border crossings by an
average immigrant rather than changes in the total time he plans to spend
working in the U.S. It is the latter which is most crucial to issues
regarding the impact of illegal Mexican immigration on U.S. labor markets.
(2) A related point has to do with the effects of extra border
enforcement. An immigrant will certainly make fewer trips if he must
expend more effort and resources in getting aCross the border. However,
the impact on total time spent in the foreign labor market is unclear. The
substitution effect associated with an increase in travelling costs is of
unknown sign, depending upon whether total home residence is complementary
with or substitutable for frequency of visit. The income effect
unambiguously encourages the immigrant to spend more time in the foreign
country. A policy of more vigorous border patrol enforcement may well
prove counterproductive.7
(3) It was also shown that lifetime participation in the foreign labor
market will be more responsive to changes in the home wage than to equal,
but opposite, changes in the foreign wage. Thus, policies which seek to
raise the wages of native workers who directly compete with immigrants by
raising wages in the source country (such as trade preferences or subsidies
to foreign investment) will be more effective than policies which do so by
reducing the wages earned by immigrants in the host country (employer
penalties, for example, whose incidence would likely involve a reduction in






preferred is more problematic, of course, depending upon which set is more
expensive to implement.-16-
Endnotes
lIt is always possible to spend all but two instants of time in the
foreign country, but this would entail a round trip between the two
countries and hence the associated travelling costs.
2A subsequent algebraic development of PV will recognize the necessity
of making a final return trip to the home country whenever n > O.
3The model abstracts from transitory changes in economic conditions
and focuses upon the effects of long-term changes in wages on immigrant
behavior. In my opinion, this is an appropriate way of thinking about
decisions concerning the allocation of lifetime work effort or the number
of trips to be made between countries. And it is certainly the right
framework for discussing changes in immigration policy, changes which would
permanently alter wage differentials and/or travelling costs. However, the
model is not well-equipped to determine the precise timing of trips made to
the foreign country. A transitory increase in the foreign wage, for
example, need not affect Mor n, but it would certainly cause immigrants to·
hasten their departures.
4In other words, assume that the marginal utility of net income is
infinite whenever y < yO, but that it is zero whenever y > yO. The







51 have been reminded of the practice of spreading out vacation time
over the year so as to smooth consumption of leisure.
6Two such studies are Mario I. B1ejer, Harry G. Johnson, and Arturo C.
Porzecanski, "Un analisis de los determinantes economicos de 1a migracion
mexicana legal e i1ega1 hacia los Estados Unidos," Demografia ~ economia
11, no.3 (1977): 326-40 and Walter Fogel, "Twentieth-Century Mexican
Migration to the United States," in The Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues - --
and Policies, ed. Barry R. Chiswick (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982): 193-221.
7Border enforcement is also shown to have an ambiguous impact in
Wilfred J. Ethier, "Illegal Immigration,"unpublished paper, University of
Pennsylvania, February 1984. The reasoning there is very much different,
however. In Ethier's model, enforcement expenditures are financed by a
proportional tax on the wages of all host-country workers. Unlike the
present model, increases in enforcement effort necessarily reduce the
supply of immigrant labor and raise the net wages of native unskilled
workers. But, because of the tax, gross unskilled wages can either rise or
fall. Extra enforcement effort can then result in an increase in the
number of immigrants who work in the host country.